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Antwi-Afari, M F, Li, H, Edwards, D J, Pärn, E A, Seo, J and Wong, A (2017) Effects of different weights and lifting postures on balance control following repetitive lifting tasks in construction workers. International Journal of Building Pathology and Adaptation, 35(03), 247–63.
Ballesteros-Pérez, P and Skitmore, M (2017) On the distribution of bids for construction contract auctions. Construction Management and Economics, 35(03), 106-21.
Barrett, P (2007) Revaluing Construction: a holistic model. Building Research & Information, 35(03), 268–86.
Clarke, L, Gleeson, C and Winch, C (2017) What kind of expertise is needed for low energy construction?. Construction Management and Economics, 35(03), 78-89.
Cummings, S, Mcdougall, J A and Swaffield, J A (2007) Hydraulic assessment of non-circular-section building drainage. Building Research & Information, 35(03), 316–28.
Edwards, D J and Holt, G D (2007) Construction hand tools: vibration emissions from alternative inserts. Building Research & Information, 35(03), 329–42.
Forsythe, P (2017) Quantifying the recurring nature of fitout to assist LCA studies in office buildings. International Journal of Building Pathology and Adaptation, 35(03), 233–46.
Itard, L and Klunder, G (2007) Comparing environmental impacts of renovated housing stock with new construction. Building Research & Information, 35(03), 252–67.
Jones, W, Gibb, A, Goodier, C and Bust, P (2017) Managing the unknown: Addressing the potential health risks of nanomaterials in the built environment. Construction Management and Economics, 35(03), 122-36.
Liu, J, Gao, R, Cheah, C Y J and Luo, J (2017) Evolutionary game of investors' opportunistic behaviour during the operational period in PPP projects. Construction Management and Economics, 35(03), 137-53.
- Type: Journal Article
- Keywords: PPP projects; opportunistic behavior; investors; evolutionary game; operational period; public private partnerships
- ISBN/ISSN: 0144-6193
- URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2016.1237033
- Abstract:
In public-private partnership (PPP) projects, during the operational period, private investors are prone to act opportunistically in pursuit of their own gain. Based on the perspectives of government's administrative supervisory functions, this paper analyses the issue of strategic choice for opportunistic behaviour by the government and private investors during the operational period of projects using evolutionary game theory. The results show that there is not a single set of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) between the government and the investors. The end results of the evolutionary game are related to the initial states of the system. Conditions that would dissuade investors from adopting an opportunistic behaviour, and settings that would encourage government to supervise closely, are explored. Punishments set by the government, which would then lead to different ultimate choices made by these two parties, are also discussed. Finally, the paper proposes a few policy recommendations for government supervision on the basis of parametric analysis. The findings also serve as a reference for the decision-making process of the government and the investors.;In public-private partnership (PPP) projects, during the operational period, private investors are prone to act opportunistically in pursuit of their own gain. Based on the perspectives of government's administrative supervisory functions, this paper analyses the issue of strategic choice for opportunistic behaviour by the government and private investors during the operational period of projects using evolutionary game theory. The results show that there is not a single set of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) between the government and the investors. The end results of the evolutionary game are related to the initial states of the system. Conditions that would dissuade investors from adopting an opportunistic behaviour, and settings that would encourage government to supervise closely, are explored. Punishments set by the government, which would then lead to different ultimate choices made by these two parties, are also discussed. Finally, the paper proposes a few policy recommendations for government supervision on the basis of parametric analysis. The findings also serve as a reference for the decision-making process of the government and the investors.;
Loosemore, M and Lim, B T H (2017) Linking corporate social responsibility and organizational performance in the construction industry. Construction Management and Economics, 35(03), 90-105.
Milion, R N, Alves, T d C and Paliari, J C (2017) Impacts of residential construction defects on customer satisfaction. International Journal of Building Pathology and Adaptation, 35(03), 218–32.
Mohamed, M, Pärn, E A and Edwards, D J (2017) Brexit: measuring the impact upon skilled labour in the UK construction industry. International Journal of Building Pathology and Adaptation, 35(03), 264–79.
Nelms, C E, Russell, A D and Lence, B J (2007) Assessing the performance of sustainable technologies: a framework and its application. Building Research & Information, 35(03), 237–51.
Nielsen, K J (2017) A comparison of inspection practices within the construction industry between the Danish and Swedish work environment authorities. Construction Management and Economics, 35(03), 154-69.
Ofori-Boadu, A N, Shofoluwe, M A and Pyle, R (2017) Development of a Housing Eligibility Assessment Scoring Method for low-income urgent repair programs. International Journal of Building Pathology and Adaptation, 35(03), 194–217.
Short, C A, Barrett, P, Dye, A and Sutrisna, M (2007) Impacts of value engineering on five Capital Arts projects. Building Research & Information, 35(03), 287–315.