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Borgeson, S and Brager, G (2011) Comfort standards and variations in exceedance for mixed-mode buildings. Building Research & Information, 39(02), 33.

C├óndido, C, Lamberts, R, de Dear, R, Bittencourt, L and de Vecchi, R (2011) Towards a Brazilian standard for naturally ventilated buildings: guidelines for thermal and air movement acceptability. Building Research & Information, 39(02), 145–53.

de Dear, R (2011) Revisiting an old hypothesis of human thermal perception: alliesthesia. Building Research & Information, 39(02), 108–17.

Guo, K, Zhang, L and Wang, T (2021) Concession period optimisation in complex projects under uncertainty: a public–private partnership perspective. Construction Management and Economics, 39(02), 156–72.

Le, P L, Jarroudi, I, Dao, T and Chaabane, A (2021) Integrated construction supply chain: an optimal decision-making model with third-party logistics partnership. Construction Management and Economics, 39(02), 133–55.

Moezzi, M and Goins, J (2011) Text mining for occupant perspectives on the physical workplace. Building Research & Information, 39(02), 169–82.

Scharpff, J, Schraven, D, Volker, L, Spaan, M T J and de Weerdt, M M (2021) Can multiple contractors self-regulate their joint service delivery? A serious gaming experiment on road maintenance planning. Construction Management and Economics, 39(02), 99–116.

  • Type: Journal Article
  • Keywords: Performance-based contracting; network management; self-regulation; gaming and simulation; contractors;
  • ISBN/ISSN: 0144-6193
  • URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2020.1806336
  • Abstract:
    The next step in the use of innovative, dynamic and performance-based contracts for service delivery by contractors could be use of monetary incentives to stimulate self-regulation of the network. Because it is currently unclear how performance-based payments in network tenders can effectively encourage network members to coordinate their own operations, a serious game was performed that simulates road maintenance planning to study changes in decision making and the emergence of network coordination. The experiments show that monetary incentives influence decision making, but their effect may be opposite to their intended aim and can lead to a competitive network. It was, however, also found that this competitiveness is not shown in networks where members are familiar with each other. This leads to the conclusion that penalty-based incentive mechanisms probably interfere with self-regulation and that the social dimension of contractor collaboration is paramount to the success of network-based contracting of construction activities.

Strengers, Y and Maller, C (2011) Integrating health, housing and energy policies: social practices of cooling. Building Research & Information, 39(02), 154–68.

Wang, R, Lu, W and Wei, Y (2021) Owners’ use of contract-based power in construction project transactions: restrictions from process specificity and uncertainty. Construction Management and Economics, 39(02), 117–32.

Zhang, H, Arens, E and Pasut, W (2011) Air temperature thresholds for indoor comfort and perceived air quality. Building Research & Information, 39(02), 134–44.

Zhang, J and Yuan, X (2021) Stochastic modelling of maintenance flexibility in Value for Money assessment of PPP road projects. Construction Management and Economics, 39(02), 173–91.