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Abdul-Aziz, A-R, Ngau, D P, Lim, Y M and Nuruddin, A R (2011) Internationalization of Malaysian quantity surveying firms: exploring the best fit models. Construction Management and Economics, 29(01), 49–58.

Brown, A D and Phua, F T T (2011) Subjectively construed identities and discourse: towards a research agenda for construction management. Construction Management and Economics, 29(01), 83–95.

Chang, Y, Wilkinson, S, Potangaroa, R and Seville, E (2011) Identifying factors affecting resource availability for post-disaster reconstruction: a case study in China. Construction Management and Economics, 29(01), 37–48.

Davey, C L, Lowe, D J and Duff, A R (2001) Generating opportunities for SMEs to develop partnerships and improve performance. Building Research & Information, 29(01), 1–11.

Dursun, O and Stoy, C (2011) Time-cost relationship of building projects: statistical adequacy of categorization with respect to project location. Construction Management and Economics, 29(01), 97–106.

Gundes, S (2011) Exploring the dynamics of the Turkish construction industry using input-output analysis. Construction Management and Economics, 29(01), 59–68.

Kululanga, G K, Edum-Fotwe, F T and McCaffer, R (2001) Measuring construction contractors' organizational learning. Building Research & Information, 29(01), 21–9.

Landin, A and Nilsson, C-H (2001) Do quality systems really make a difference?. Building Research & Information, 29(01), 12–20.

Lansley, P R (2001) Building research and the quality-of-life. Building Research & Information, 29(01), 62–74.

Lu, W, Olofsson, T and Stehn, L (2011) A lean-agile model of homebuilders' production systems. Construction Management and Economics, 29(01), 25–35.

Mbiti, T K, Blismas, N, Wakefield, R and Lombardo, R (2011) System archetypes underlying the problematic behaviour of construction activity in Kenya. Construction Management and Economics, 29(01), 3–13.

Ofori, G (2001) Indicators for measuring construction industry development in developing countries. Building Research & Information, 29(01), 40–50.

Shih, N-J and Huang, Y-S (2001) A study of reflection glare in Taipei. Building Research & Information, 29(01), 30–9.

Thomson, D (2011) A pilot study of client complexity, emergent requirements and stakeholder perceptions of project success. Construction Management and Economics, 29(01), 69–82.

Wu, J, Kumaraswamy, M and Soo, G K L (2011) Dubious benefits from future exchange: an explanation of payment arrears from "continuing clients" in Mainland China. Construction Management and Economics, 29(01), 15–23.

  • Type: Journal Article
  • Keywords: payment arrears; opportunism; collaboration; transaction cost; game theory
  • ISBN/ISSN: 0144-6193
  • URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2010.521757
  • Abstract:
    Clients and contractors are frequently advised to adopt a collaborative attitude and approach in construction projects in general, with ‘continuing clients’, i.e. clients with continuous large projects portfolios, expected to be in the forefront of such initiatives. Although such a governance approach has been argued to be beneficial in construction transactions, it is not uncommon to hear contractors complaining that clients do not fulfil their payment obligations. For example, in Mainland China, a large proportion of deliberate payment arrears are from ‘continuing clients’. Gametric models are used in this research to show that three prerequisites are needed for inducing continuing clients to be cooperative. Empirical evidence from legislation and a questionnaire survey indicates that these preconditions are not fulfilled in Mainland China. Prevalent institutional arrangements, differentials in appreciation of the value of relationships, and opaque payment track records are found to contribute to continuing clients’ deviation from the often advocated amicable approaches. Thus, transaction attributes seem to only suggest a theoretically optimal governance structure from the perspective of transaction costs, but other factors may also substantially influence parties’ calculation and choice.