

EVALUATING THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROJECT TEAM MEMBERS TO TIME-OVERRUN IN NIGERIAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROJECTS

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The long delay experienced in projects executed by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) calls for concern that prompts an investigation into the contribution of members of the project team. The objectives of the study are to evaluate and compare the contribution to time-overrun by the different members of project team involved in FGN projects. The aim is to guide the government on how to source for project team members and reduce long delay experienced in its projects. To achieve this aim, a field survey involving a sample of 78 project leaders in charge of FGN projects that were executed in 2008 was conducted. The projects were executed by the ministry in charge of projects (Federal Ministry of Works, Housing and Environment) for the three arms of government namely: Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. For the study, 6 key project team members were selected. Data collected were project types, team members' type and project leaders' assessment of their contribution to time-overrun in FGN projects. Data were collected using structured questionnaires and analysed using mean item score, percentage and ranking. The results reveal that project leaders' perceive government as the highest contributor to time-overrun in its projects. Main contractors are perceived as the next highest contributor, followed by government officials. The study sees the urgent need for a change in FGN approach to how it discharges its duties in the delivery of its projects, improved service performance on the part of contractors, consultants and suppliers used and adequate involvement of state government officials in the delivery of FGN projects in its results and advocate that stakeholders should embark on measures for achieving them.

Keywords: expatriate contractors, federal government projects, indigenous contractors, project team members, time-overrun.

INTRODUCTION

Construction projects serve as development and production inputs. Their rate of supply can retard or expedite the rate of economic development. For this reason, both public and private sectors commit substantial fund into the development of construction projects annually. In developing economies, research studies established that government is the major financier of construction projects. In Nigeria, the dominance of government as the main promoter of construction projects is highly pronounced as the private sector even depends on government expenditure. The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) according to the Nigerian constitution is made up of three arms namely: Executive, Legislative and Judiciary (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). The FGN Appropriation Acts from January 2000 to December 2008 showed that the sum of N5.036 trillion (43.5%) was appropriated for capital expenditure while the sum of N6.545 trillion (56.5%) was appropriated for recurrent expenditure (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2009). The figure indicates that the

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development of construction projects depends mostly on public sector funding. The rate of completion of these projects falls considerably below the rate at which they are conceived. The main cause of this phenomenon is the delay experienced in the delivery of the projects (Dlakwa and Culpin, 1999). Scott (1993) opined that the completion of construction projects within prescribed time scale is an important measure of project success. Research studies discovered that time-overrun is an existing phenomenon and a major problem in the delivery of construction projects (Okpala and Aniekwu, 1988; Assaf and Al-Heiji, 2006). Mansfield *et al.* (1994) discovered excessive time-overruns in completed projects executed by the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing (FMWH) the ministry responsible for the implementation of FGN projects.

Time-overrun which refers to the difference between initial and actual contract periods or the amount of delay experienced in the delivery of a project is a common problem in construction project delivery worldwide. Studies on the problem have been focussed on the causes and have identified several causes of the problem (Okpala and Aniekwu, 1988; Dlakwa and Culpin, 1990; Mansfield *et al.* 1994; Odeyinka and Yusif, 1997; Kaming *et al.* 1997; Radujkovic, 1999; Odeh and Battaineh, 2002). Some of these studies recognised the role of the parties to the delivery of projects on the problem by categorising the factors according to the parties responsible. The notable parties identified are client, consultants, suppliers and contractors. Nigerian contractors are commonly classified into two groups namely: indigenous and expatriates (Iyagba, 1999; Idoro, 2007). The findings of these studies created the awareness that the understanding of the contribution of project parties to time-overrun is important in addressing the problem. There is however a dearth of studies on how project parties contribute to time-overrun in the delivery of projects. This study complements previous ones on the problem of time-overrun in the delivery of public sector projects by focussing on the contribution of project team members to time-overrun in FGN projects. The objectives are to evaluate the contribution of selected project team members to time-overrun in FGN projects in general and in specific projects.

RESEARCH STUDIES

The study required primary data on the numerous projects being executed by FGN which were spread over the 36 states in Nigeria therefore; it adopted a questionnaire survey approach to achieve its objectives. In the approach, a field survey involving FGN projects located in the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) that make up the geo-political entity called Nigeria which were embarked upon in 2008 fiscal year was carried out. A preliminary survey was first conducted to identify 115 projects being executed by FGN. The population of the study consists of project leaders of the projects. The project leaders were either project managers or architects or engineer responsible for coordinating the activities of other project team members. From this population, a sample of 78 project leaders was selected by random sampling. Data were collected on project characteristics (ownership, project, contract, procurement and contractor types) and respondents' assessment of the level of contribution to time-overrun in FGN projects by parties involved in their delivery. 6 parties namely: client, main contractor, government officials, consultants, nominated suppliers and sub-contractors were selected. Data were measured using five ranks namely: nil, low, moderate, high and very high which were weighted as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Data were analysed using mean Item Score, percentage and ranking.

RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS

The results of the analysis of data collected are presented as follows:

Descriptive results of the characteristics of projects used for the study

The study analysed the distribution of projects used for the study according to their characteristics. For this purpose, five project characteristics namely: project ownership, type, contract type, procurement type and contractor type were selected. The descriptive results of the distribution of the projects are presented as follows:

Ownership of Federal Government projects

The percentage distribution of the ownership of the projects used for the study among the three arms of the FGN is presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Descriptive results of the percentage distribution of the projects used for the study

Project characteristic	N	%	Rank	Project characteristic	N	%	Rank
Project Ownership				Project Type			
Executive	62	88.6	1	Building	56	73.7	1
Judiciary	6	8.6	2	Road	12	15.8	2
Legislative	2	2.9	3	Water	4	5.6	3
Total	70	100		Electricity	4	5.6	4
Contractor Type				Procurement Method			
Indigenous	48	61.5	1	Design-Bid-Build	60	78.9	1
Expatriate	30	38.5	2	Design-Build	12	15.8	2
Total	78	100		Direct Labour	2	2.6	3
Contract Type				Labour-only			
Fluctuating sum	28	36.8		Labour-only	2	2.6	3
Lump sum	26	34.2	1	Total	76	100	
Fixed sum	22	29.0	2				
Total	76	100	3				

N=Number

The results in Table 1 reveal that the percentage of projects owned by the executive arm of FGN (88.6) ranks 1st. The percentage of projects owned by judicial arm of FGN (8.6) ranks 2nd while the percentage of projects owned by the legislative arm of FGN (2.9) ranks 3rd. The results indicate that majority of the projects used for the study are owned by the executive arm of the government.

Types of projects used for the study

In the preliminary survey conducted 4 project types namely: building, road, water and electricity were identified to be common FGN projects. The percentage distribution of the types of projects used for the study is presented in Table 1.

The results in Table 1 reveal that the percentage of building projects (73.7) used for the study ranks 1st. The percentages of road (15.8), water (5.6) and electricity (5.6) projects rank 2nd, 3rd and 4th respectively. The results indicate that building projects constitute the majority of projects used for the study. Road projects are next to building projects while water and electricity projects are the least.

Contract types for projects used for the study

The percentage of projects used for the study that were executed by different contract types was also investigated. Three contract types namely: lump sum, fluctuating sum

and target sum which are common with FGN projects were selected. The percentage of projects used for the study executed by each contract type is presented in Table 1.

The results in Table 1 show that the percentage of projects executed by fluctuating sum contract (36.8) ranks first. The percentages of projects executed by lump sum (34.2) and fixed sum (29) contracts rank 2nd and 3rd respectively. The results indicate that the three types of contract are used for the projects sampled however; fluctuating sum is the most used contract type, followed by lump sum contract and fixed sum contract.

Procurement methods for procuring the projects used for the study

The procurement arrangements used for the projects sampled was also investigated. Four arrangements namely: Design-Bid-Build (DBB), Design-Build (DB), Direct Labour (DL) and Labour-Only (LO) were selected. The percentage of projects used for the study executed by each procurement arrangement is presented in Table 1.

The results in Table 1 show that the percentage of projects used for the study procured by DBB arrangement (78.9) ranks 1st. The percentage of projects procured by DB arrangement (15.8) ranks 2nd while those of DL (2.6) and LO (2.6) arrangements rank 3rd. The result indicates that traditional contract arrangement was the most used procurement method for the projects sampled. DB arrangements was the second most used procurement arrangement while DL and LO arrangements were the least used arrangements.

Types of contractor who executed the projects used for the study

The types of contractors who executed the projects used for the study were also investigated. For this purpose, Nigerian contractors generally were classified into indigenous and expatriate. The percentages of projects sampled that were executed by the two categories of contractors are presented in Table 1.

The results in Table 1 show that the percentage of projects used for the study that were executed by indigenous contractors (61.5) ranks 1st while that of expatriate contractors (38.5) ranks 2nd. The result indicates that majority of the projects sampled was executed by indigenous contractors.

Contribution of selected project team members to time-overrun in FGN projects

The main interest of the study is to find out how each member of the project team has contributed to time-overrun in FGN projects. Six project team members namely: client, main contractor, government officials, consultants, sub-contractors and nominated suppliers were selected. The contribution of the parties selected to time-overrun in the projects sampled was measured as explained above. Their contribution to time-overrun was analysed using Mean Item Score (MIS). The ranking of the results is presented in Table 2.

The results in Table 2 reveal that the level of contribution of government to time-overrun (MIS=0.77) ranks 1st. The contribution of the main contractor (MIS=0.64) ranks 2nd while that of project consultants (MIS=0.59) ranks 3rd. The contribution of government officials involved in enforcing regulations (MIS=0.57) ranks 4th while the contribution of nominated suppliers (MIS=0.53) and sub-contractors (MIS=0.52) to time-overrun rank 5th and 6th respectively. The results imply that project leaders perceive Federal Government itself as the highest contributor to delay in the projects it executes. Main contractors contribute next to government, followed by project consultants, government officials and nominated suppliers according to severity of

contribution to delay. Sub-contractors are perceived to be the least contributor to delay in FGN projects.

Table 2 Ranking of the level of contribution of project team members to time-overrun in FGN projects

Team member	Number	Mean item score	Rank
Client	78	0.77	1
Main contractor	76	0.64	2
Consultants	80	0.59	3
Government officials	72	0.57	4
Nominated suppliers	76	0.53	5
Sub-contractors	76	0.52	6

Contribution of project team members to time-overrun in FGN projects' types

The levels of contribution of project team members to time-overrun in FGN projects based on the project characteristics selected above were measured as explained above and analysed using MIS. The results are presented in Table 3.

On the level of contribution of government to time-overrun in FGN projects, Table 3 shows that the legislative arm of the FGN is the highest contributor to delay in project delivery. The executive arm is the next highest contributor while the judiciary is the least. Table 3 also reveals that FGN contribution to delay in project delivery is highest in electricity projects, followed by building and water projects while that of road projects is the least. The result reveals that government contribution to delay in projects procured by fixed price and fluctuating price is the same but that of projects procured by lump sum contract is higher than the two. The results in Table 3 show that government contribution to delay in the delivery of its projects is highest in projects procured by LO method, followed by projects procured by DB and DBB methods while that of projects procured by DL method is the least. The result shows that FGN contribution to project delivery is higher in projects executed by indigenous contractors than in projects executed by expatriate contractors.

On the contribution of the main contractor to time-overrun in FGN projects, Table 3 shows that the main contractor contributes most to delay in projects that belong to the executive arm, followed by projects that belong to the legislature and least in projects that belong to the judiciary. The main contractor equally contributes most to delay in electricity and water projects, followed by road projects and least in building projects. The main contractor also contributes most to delay in FGN projects that are procured by fixed price, followed by fluctuating price and least in lump sum. The contribution of the main contractor to time-overrun is also discovered to be higher when FGN procures projects by DBB method than DB method. The results in Table 3 also indicate that the main contractor contribution to delays in the delivery of FGN projects is higher when the main contractor is an indigenous contractor than when he is an expatriate contractor. The result in Table 3 shows that the contribution of nominated supplier to time-overrun is highest in projects executed by the judiciary, followed by projects executed by the executive while that of the legislature is the least. It also reveals that delay in FGN projects caused by nominated suppliers is highest in electricity projects, followed by building and road projects while that of water projects is the least.

Table 3 Ranking of the contribution of project team members based on selected project features

Member	N	MIS	Rank	Member	N	MIS	Rank	Member	N	MIS	Rank
Client				Main contr.				Consult.			
Ownership				Ownership				Ownership			
Legislative	2	1.00	1	Executive	60	0.64	1	Legislative	2	0.80	1
Executive	62	0.75	2	Legislative	2	0.60	2	Judiciary	6	0.60	2
Judiciary	6	0.67	3	Judiciary	6	0.53	3	Executive	64	0.56	3
Total	70			Total	68			Total	72		
Project type				Project type				Project type			
Electricity	4	0.80	1	Electricity	4	0.80	1	Electricity	4	0.80	1
Building	56	0.79	2	Water	2	0.80	1	Water	4	0.80	1
Water	4	0.70	3	Road	12	0.73	3	Building	56	0.56	3
Road	12	0.63	4	Building	56	0.61	4	Road	12	0.47	4
Total	76			Total	74			Total	76		
Contr. type				Contr. type				Contr. type			
Lump sum	26	0.83	1	Fixed price	22	0.67	1	Lump sum	26	0.62	1
Fixed price	22	0.73	2	Fluct. price	28	0.64	2	Fluct. price	28	0.57	2
Fluct. price	28	0.73	2	Lump sum	24	0.60	3	Fixed price	22	0.51	3
Total	76			Total	74			Total	76		
Proc. type				Proc. type				Proc. type			
LO	2	1.00	1	LO	2	0.80	1	LO	2	0.80	1
DB	12	0.83	2	DBB	60	0.65	2	DB	12	0.70	2
DBB	60	0.77	3	DB	12	0.63	3	DBB	60	0.54	3
DL	2	0.40	4	DL	2	0.40	4	DL	2	0.40	4
Total	76			Total	76			Total	76		
Contr. type				Contr. type				Contr. type			
Indigenous	48	0.79	1	Indigenous	46	0.66	1	Indigenous	50	0.59	1
Expatriate	30	0.73	2	Expatriate	30	0.61	2	Expatriate	30	0.57	2
Total	78			Total	76			Total	80		
Nom. Supl.				Sub-contr.				Govt. Off.			
Ownership				Ownership				Ownership			
Judiciary	6	0.67	1	Judiciary	6	0.60	1	Legislative	2	0.80	1
Executive	60	0.47	2	Executive	60	0.47	2	Judiciary	6	0.60	2
Legislative	2	0.40	3	Legislative	2	0.40	3	Executive	56	0.53	3
Total	68			Total	68			Total	64		
Project type				Project type				Project type			
Electricity	4	0.60	1	Electricity	4	0.60	1	Electricity	4	0.80	1
Building	56	0.55	2	Water	2	0.60	1	Building	54	0.57	2
Road	12	0.47	3	Building	56	0.52	3	Road	12	0.47	3
Water	2	0.40	4	Road	12	0.50	4	Total	70		
Total	74			Total	74						
Contr. type				Contr. type				Contr. Type	24	0.67	1
Lump sum	24	0.58	1	Lump sum	24	0.55	1	Lump sum	22	0.55	2
Fixed price	22	0.51	2	Fixed price	22	0.53	2	Fixed price	26	0.51	3
Fluct. price	28	0.51	2	Fluct. price	28	0.49	3	Fluc. price	72		
Total	74			Total	74			Total			
Proc. type				Proc. type				Proc. type			
DBB	60	0.55	1	LO	2	0.60	1	DBB	58	0.59	1
DB	12	0.50	2	DBB	60	0.53	2	DB	12	0.50	2
LO	2	0.40	3	DB	12	0.53	2	DL	2	0.40	3
DL	2	0.20	4	DL	2	0.20	4	Total	72		
Total	76			Total	76						
Contr. type				Contr. type				Contr. type	46	0.63	1
Indigenous	46	0.56	1	Expatriate	30	0.55	1	Indigenous	26	0.49	2
Expatriate	30	0.49	2	Indigenous	46	0.53	2	Expatriate	72		
Total	76			Total	76			Total			

Contr=contract, fluct=fluctuating, N=Number, MIS=Mean item score

The results in Table 3 also show that delay caused by nominated suppliers is the same in FGN projects procured by fixed price and fluctuating price contracts and lower than that of projects procured by lump sum contract. The result also show that the contribution to time-overrun by nominated suppliers in FGN projects procured is highest in projects procured by DBB method, next to highest in DB and LO projects and least in DL projects. It also shows that nominated suppliers contribute more to delay in project delivery when projects are executed by indigenous contractors than when executed by expatriate contractors.

The results in Table 3 show that the contribution of sub-contractors to time-overrun in projects executed by the judiciary (MIS=0.60) ranks 1st while that of projects executed by the executive (MIS=0.47) and legislature (MIS=0.40) ranks 2nd and 3rd respectively. This result indicates that sub-contractors contribute most to delay in the delivery of FGN projects in projects that belong to the judiciary, followed by projects that belong to the executive and least in projects that belong to the legislature. Sub-contractors' contribution to time-overrun in FGN electricity (MIS=0.60) and water (MIS=0.60) projects rank 1st, that of building projects (MIS=0.52) ranks 3rd while that of road projects (MIS=0.50) ranks 4th. The result implies that sub-contractors contribute most to time-overrun in electricity and water projects, followed by building projects and least in road projects. Sub-contractors' contribution to time-overrun in projects procured by lump sum contract (MIS=0.55) ranks 1st, that of fixed price contract (MIS=0.53) ranks 2nd while that of fluctuating price contract (MIS=0.49) ranks 3rd. This result implies that delay caused by sub-contractors is highest in lump sum projects, second to highest in fixed price projects and least in fluctuating price projects. Sub-contractors' contribution to time-overrun in LO projects (MIS=0.60) ranks 1st, those of DBB (MIS=0.53) and DB (MIS=0.53) rank 2nd while that of DL (MIS=0.20) ranks 4th. The result indicates that sub-contractors contribution to delay in the delivery of FGN projects is highest when they are procured by LO method, second to highest when procured by DBB and DB methods and least when procured by DL method. Sub-contractors' contribution to time-overrun in FGN projects executed by indigenous contractors (MIS=0.55) ranks 1st while that of projects executed by expatriate contractors (MIS=0.53) ranks 2nd. The result suggests that sub-contractors will contribute more to delay in the delivery of FGN projects when such projects are executed by indigenous than expatriate contractors.

Table 3 also shows that the contribution of government officials to time-overrun in projects executed by the legislative arm of FGN (MIS=0.80) ranks 1st while those of projects executed by the judicial arm (MIS=0.60) and executive arm (MIS=0.53) rank 2nd and 3rd respectively. This result implies that project leaders perceive the delay caused by government officials to be highest in projects that belong to the legislature, second to highest in projects that belong to judiciary and least in projects that belong to the executive. Government officials contribution to time-overrun in FGN electricity projects (MIS=0.80) ranks 1st, in building (MIS=0.57) and road (MIS=0.47) projects rank 2nd and 3rd respectively. The result shows that government officials contribute most to delay in FGN projects when such are electricity projects, followed by building projects and least in road projects. Government officials contribution to time-overrun in lump sum contracts (MIS=0.67) ranks 1st, in fixed price contracts (MIS=0.55) ranks 2nd and in fluctuating price contracts (MIS=0.51) ranks 3rd. The result suggests that the contribution of government officials to delay in FGN projects is highest in projects executed by lump sum contract, second to highest in projects executed by fixed price contract and lowest in projects executed by fluctuating price contract.

Government officials contribution to time-overrun in DBB projects (MIS=0.59) ranks 1st, in DB projects (MIS=0.50) ranks 2nd and in DL projects (MIS=0.51) ranks 3rd. The result is an indication that the contribution of government officials to delay in FGN projects is highest in projects executed by DBB method, second to highest in projects executed by DB method and lowest in projects executed by DL method. Government officials contribution to time-overrun in FGN projects executed by indigenous contractors (MIS=0.63) ranks 1st while that of projects executed by expatriate contractors (MIS=0.49) ranks 2nd. The result again suggests that government officials will contribute more to delay when FGN projects are executed by indigenous than expatriate contractors.

Table 3 reveals that the contribution of consultants to time-overrun in projects executed by the legislative arm of FGN (MIS=0.80) ranks 1st while those of projects executed by the judicial arm (MIS=0.60) and executive arm (MIS=0.56) rank 2nd and 3rd respectively. This result implies that project leaders perceive the delay caused by consultants as highest in projects that belong to the legislature, second to highest in projects that belong to judiciary and lowest in projects that belong to the executive. Consultants contribution to time-overrun in FGN electricity (MIS=0.80) and water (MIS=0.80) projects rank 1st, in building (MIS=0.56) and road (MIS=0.47) projects rank 3rd and 4th respectively. The result indicates that project consultants will contribute most to delay in FGN projects when such are electricity and water projects, followed by building projects and least in road projects. Consultants contribution to time-overrun in lump sum contracts (MIS=0.62) ranks 1st, in fluctuating price contracts (MIS=0.57) ranks 2nd and in fixed price contracts (MIS=0.51) ranks 3rd. The result shows that the contribution of consultants to delay in FGN projects is highest in projects executed by lump sum contract, second to highest in projects executed by fluctuating price contract and lowest in projects executed by fixed price contract. Project consultants contribution to time-overrun in LO projects (MIS=0.80) ranks 1st, in DB (MIS=0.70) and DBB (MIS=0.54) projects ranks 2nd and 3rd respectively and in DL projects (MIS=0.40) ranks 4th. The result is an indication that the contribution of consultants to delay in FGN projects is highest in projects executed by LO method, second and third to highest in projects executed by DB and DBB methods and lowest in projects executed by DL method. Project consultants contribution to time-overrun in FGN projects executed by indigenous contractors (MIS=0.59) ranks 1st while that of projects executed by expatriate contractors (MIS=0.57) ranks 2nd. The result suggests that consultants will also contribute more to delay when FGN projects are executed by indigenous than expatriate contractors.

Discussion of findings

The result of the study has established that Federal Government is the highest contributor to delay in the projects it executes. This result confirms the results of previous studies (Odeyinka and Yusuf, 1997) and suggests that efforts to deliver FGN promptly will require a change in either the duties of government in the delivery of its projects or the manner by which these duties are discharged. While this change should be generalised, such should apply first to electricity projects and projects executed by the legislature, indigenous contractors, lump sum contract and LO method. The study also suggests the need for improvement in the performance of main contractors for FGN projects to be delivered promptly. In the same manner with government duties, such improvement is mostly required in electricity projects and projects executed by the executive, indigenous contractors, fixed price contract and LO method.

While the services of consultants are inevitable in project delivery, the result that consultants are the third highest contributor to delay in FGN projects suggests the need for improvement in their service performance for FGN projects to be delivered promptly. Such improvement is mostly required in electricity projects and projects executed by the legislature, indigenous contractors, lump sum contract and LO method. The position of government officials as the fourth highest contributor to time-overrun suggests that their contribution cannot be overlooked. Efforts are required to minimise their contribution by involving them fully at pre-contract stage. Such efforts should apply first to electricity projects and projects executed by the legislature, indigenous contractors, lump sum contract and DBB method.

The results of the study on the contribution of nominated suppliers and sub-contractors to delay in FGN projects also suggest the need for improved performance on their part if the projects should be delivered promptly. The use of nominated suppliers can be minimised in favour of contractor supply of materials where such can reduce delay. When the need for nominated suppliers is required, efforts are needed to ensure prompt delivery of such materials. Such efforts should apply mostly to electricity projects and projects executed by the judiciary, indigenous contractors, lump sum contract and DBB method. Just like main contractors, the study suggests the need for improvement in the performance of sub-contractors used in the delivery of FGN projects. Such improvement is mostly required in electricity projects and projects executed by the judiciary, expatriate contractors, lump sum contract and LO method.

CONCLUSION

The study has revealed the manner by which project team members contribute to time-overrun in the different types of projects that were executed by FGN. The contribution of FGN as discovered in this study and previous studies suggests the urgent need for a change in FGN approach to how it discharges its duties in the delivery of its projects. Such change should focus on the modalities for making decisions, handing over site, honouring certificates, variations and communication which are discovered to be the major causes of delay caused by FGN (Odeyinka and Yusuf, 1997). High contribution to delay in FGN projects has been discovered on the part of contractors, consultants and suppliers. This result is an indication of the need for improved service performance on the part of these members. Stakeholders in the delivery of FGN projects will need to embark on measures that will re-position the parties for improved service performance. The study has added another party (government officials) to the parties responsible for delay in public projects. The result is an indication of the need for adequate involvement of such officials in the delivery of FGN projects. The notion that FGN projects by their virtue do not require registration and approval of state government officials should be discouraged to avoid disagreement that can prolong the delivery of FGN projects.

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